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Marcin Peski
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability
JC Ely, M Peski
Theoretical Economics 1 (1), 2006
1402006
Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics
M Peski
Journal of Economic Theory 145 (1), 216-248, 2010
992010
Spontaneous discrimination
M Pęski, B Szentes
American Economic Review 103 (6), 2412-36, 2013
672013
Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games
M Pęski
Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2), 732-735, 2008
572008
Critical types
JC Ely, M Pęski
The Review of Economic Studies 78 (3), 907-937, 2011
462011
Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
M Peski
382012
Repeated games with incomplete information on one side
M Peski
Theoretical Economics 3 (1), 29-84, 2008
322008
Generalization of a result on "Regressions, short and long"
F Molinari, M Peski
Econometric Theory 22, 159-163, 2006
242006
The principal-agent approach to testing experts
W Olszewski, M Pęski
American economic Journal: microeconomics 3 (2), 89-113, 2011
222011
A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
M Pęski, T Wiseman
Theoretical Economics 10 (1), 131-173, 2015
192015
Prior symmetry, categorization and similarity-based reasoning
M Peski
Journal of Economic Theory 146 (1), 2011
17*2011
Value of persistent information
M Pęski, J Toikka
Econometrica 85 (6), 1921-1948, 2017
162017
Prior symmetry, similarity-based reasoning, and endogenous categorization
M Pȩski
Journal of Economic Theory 146 (1), 111-140, 2011
162011
Large roommate problem with non-transferable random utility
M Pęski
Journal of Economic Theory 168, 432-471, 2017
152017
Value‐based distance between information structures
F Gensbittel, M Pęski, J Renault
Theoretical Economics 17 (3), 1225-1267, 2022
8*2022
Bargaining with mechanisms
M Pȩski
American Economic Review 112 (6), 2044-2082, 2022
4*2022
Equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games with gradual state changes
M Pęski, T Wiseman
Working paper, 2014
42014
An anti‐folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
M Pęski
Theoretical Economics 7 (1), 25-55, 2012
42012
Tractable model of dynamic many-to-many matching
M Pęski
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14 (2), 1-43, 2022
32022
Stationary social learning in a changing environment
R Lévy, M Pęski, N Vieille
arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.02122, 2022
32022
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Articles 1–20