Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences R Jain Games and Economic Behavior 127, 47-66, 2021 | 13 | 2021 |
SYMMETRIC MECHANISM DESIGN Y AZRIELI, R JAIN | 13 | 2015 |
Behavioral strong implementation T Hayashi, R Jain, V Korpela, M Lombardi Available at SSRN 3657095, 2020 | 11 | 2020 |
A systematic test of the independence axiom near certainty R Jain, K Nielsen | 7 | 2020 |
Generalized Groves–Ledyard Mechanisms PJ Healy, R Jain Games and Economic Behavior, 2016 | 6 | 2016 |
An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation R Jain, V Korpela, M Lombardi Available at SSRN 3861192, 2021 | 5 | 2021 |
A Note On The Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem R Jain Economic Annals 60 (207), 39-48, 2015 | 3 | 2015 |
Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information R Jain, M Lombardi Journal of Mathematical Economics 99, 102605, 2022 | 2* | 2022 |
On the relationship between Robust and Rationalizable Implementation R Jain, M Lombardi Available at SSRN 3950481, 2021 | 1 | 2021 |
Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization R Jain, M Lombardi | | 2022 |
Labour search with endogenous outside option R Jain, S Murali IIM Bangalore Research Paper, 2020 | | 2020 |