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Ilya Segal
Ilya Segal
Verified email at stanford.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets
P Milgrom, I Segal
Econometrica 70 (2), 583-601, 2002
18252002
Dynamic mechanism design: A myersonian approach
A Pavan, I Segal, J Toikka
Econometrica 82 (2), 601-653, 2014
666*2014
Optimal information disclosure
L Rayo, I Segal
Journal of political Economy 118 (5), 949-987, 2010
6242010
Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts
I Segal
The Review of Economic Studies 66 (1), 57-82, 1999
6091999
Contracting with externalities
I Segal
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (2), 337-388, 1999
5981999
Naked exclusion: comment
IR Segal, MD Whinston
American Economic Review 91 (1), 296-309, 2000
5972000
The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
N Nisan, I Segal
Journal of Economic Theory 129 (1), 192-224, 2006
430*2006
An efficient dynamic mechanism
S Athey, I Segal
Econometrica 81 (6), 2463-2485, 2013
3962013
Introduction to choice theory
J Levin, P Milgrom
3172004
Exclusive contracts and protection of investments
IR Segal, MD Whinston
RAND Journal of Economics, 603-633, 2000
3142000
Antitrust in innovative industries
I Segal, MD Whinston
American Economic Review 97 (5), 1703-1730, 2007
2742007
Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand
I Segal
American Economic Review 93 (3), 509-529, 2003
2502003
Clock auctions and radio spectrum reallocation
P Milgrom, I Segal
Journal of Political Economy 128 (1), 1-31, 2020
217*2020
Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer?
I Segal
Journal of Economic Theory 113 (2), 147-181, 2003
2032003
Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities
I Segal, MD Whinston
Econometrica 71 (3), 757-791, 2003
2022003
What makes them click: Empirical analysis of consumer demand for search advertising
P Jeziorski, I Segal
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (3), 24-53, 2015
1832015
Monopoly and soft budget constraint
IR Segal
The RAND Journal of Economics, 596-609, 1998
1671998
The Mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation (with applications to hold‐up and risk sharing)
I Segal, MD Whinston
Econometrica 70 (1), 1-45, 2002
1462002
Property rights
I Segal, MD Whinston
Handbook of organizational Economics 100, 58, 2013
1422013
Public vs. private enforcement of antitrust law: A survey
IR Segal, MD Whinston
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper, 2006
1072006
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