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Kentaro Tomoeda
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Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
K Tomoeda
Journal of Economic Theory 176, 81-117, 2018
302018
学校選択制のデザイン―ゲーム理論アプローチ
安田洋祐
NTT 出版, 2010
232010
Sophistication and cautiousness in college applications
Y Song, K Tomoeda, X Xia
Available at SSRN 3711118, 2020
112020
Efficient investments in the implementation problem
K Tomoeda
Journal of Economic Theory 182, 247-278, 2019
112019
Measuring manipulability of matching mechanisms
K Imamura, K Tomoeda
Available at SSRN 4000419, 2022
62022
Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
D Hirata, Y Kasuya, K Tomoeda
Available at SSRN 3552365, 2020
52020
Implementation of efficient investments in mechanism design
K Tomoeda
Working paper, 2015
52015
Credible Stability in the Roommate Problem
Y Kasuya, K Tomoeda
mimeo, 2012
32012
Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
D Hirata, Y Kasuya, K Tomoeda
Games and Economic Behavior 130, 474-498, 2021
22021
First-price auction implements efficient investments
K Tomoeda
Economics letters 159, 198-200, 2017
12017
Tie-Breaking or Not: A Choice Function Approach
K Imamura, K Tomoeda
Available at SSRN 4466601, 2023
2023
Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem
D Hirata, Y Kasuya, K Tomoeda
Journal of Mathematical Economics 105, 102818, 2023
2023
Optimal Top- n Policy
IE Hafalir, S Pan, K Tomoeda
Policy (December 26, 2021), 2021
2021
Essays in Mechanism and Market Design
K Tomoeda
2016
Controlled School Choice with Hard Bounds:(Non-) Existence of Fair and Non-wasteful Assignments
K Tomoeda
Working Paper. Download Citation BibTex Tagged XML Download …, 2016
2016
Auctions That Implement Efficient Investments
K Tomoeda
Working Paper. Download Citation BibTex Tagged XML Download Auction_Tomoeda …, 2015
2015
Tie-Breaking or Not: A Choice Function Approach
K Tomoeda, K Imamura
Available at SSRN 4737992, 0
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